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Abstract 
This study argues in favor of the real option methodology to calculate the access 
price for Brazilian fixed-line phone operators. The new cost-oriented regulatory 
framework for interconnection of telecommunication networks, established in 2005, 
poses questions regarding the adequate remuneration of investments. By investing in 
a fixed-line telephone network while giving access to new entrants, the incumbent is 
actually providing an option to access its infrastructure. Since options aren’t costless, 
to properly compensate the investment, an effort to estimate the option premium is 
justified. We suggest a pragmatic approach where the real options rationality appears 
as a markup over the sector’s cost of capital. Failing to consider the real option 
granted by incumbents discourages investment in infrastructure in the sector and 
hinders the intertemporal maximization of social welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
The regulatory framework for the telecommunications sector in Brazil is undergoing 
important changes. On the heels of Decree 4733, issued in 2003, and the end of the 
original concession contracts for landline operators in 20051, numerous directives 
and other measures have been established aiming to create competition, especially 
in the traditionally concentrated local fixed telephone market. 
One of the main objectives of regulatory policies to stimulate competition is to ensure 
results in regulated sectors as near as possible to those that would prevail in a 
competitive market. In other words, policies to spur competition seek moderate tariffs 
and efficient results from the technical, allocative or dynamic standpoint. But much 
more attention has been paid to keeping tariffs low than to the question of efficiency, 
particularly regarding dynamic efficiency, that is, the pattern of investments in 
infrastructure and innovation. In a sector like telecommunications, which is subject to 
such dynamic technological transformations, this imbalance is a serious error. 
The mechanisms put forward to ensure competition are many and have been the 
subject of intense academic and practical debate in recent decades. Specifically 
regarding the local fixed telephone sector in Brazil, new rules have been proposed for 
setting public and interconnection tariffs, such as disaggregating networks and 
providing portability of telephone numbers.  
In this article we start from the premise of the new cost-oriented regulatory 
framework for interconnection of telephone networks brought by Anatel Resolution 
396, issued in 2005. This policy poses serious questions regarding the adequate 
remuneration of investments. By investing in a fixed-line telephone network while 
giving access to new entrants, the incumbent is actually providing an option to 
access its infrastructure.  
This work follows the recent literature on sectorial regulation and consists of 
establishing – based on real options theory, a well-known methodology in the field of 
finance – a markup over the sector’s cost of capital as a pragmatic way to consider 
the option to access the network granted by incumbents to new players. This 
                                                 
1 The telecommunications sector was privatized in 1998, with the Brazilian government 
auctioning off its controlling interests in long distance and local service providers, along with 
concessions to the new regional fixed and mobile operators. A regulator, the National 
Telecommunications Agency (Anatel), was also created.  
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discussion has strong practical bearing and is much in evidence in the various public 
consultations of several regulatory agencies, such as England’s Office of 
Communications (Ofcom), America’s Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
The study innovates in the sense of incorporating the impact of technological 
paradigm shifts on the economic results of fixed telephone operators.  
Failing to consider the markup means the incumbent will be remunerated below its 
opportunity cost, which will inevitably discourage investments in infrastructure in the 
sector and consequently reduce both the dynamic efficiency of the policy adopted to 
stimulate competition and the social welfare generated by these services. 
The article is divided into four sections, followed by a conclusion with future 
recommendations. Section 2 presents a review of the literature to situate the reader 
within the academic debate and discusses the legal and regulatory framework to 
contextualize the work’s importance to the practical debate still ongoing. Section 3 
supplies important insights on the role of new technologies and how they can affect 
the fixed telephone business. Section 4 presents the real option model and discusses 
the robustness of the results in relation to the sensitivity to parameter changes. The 
last section presents our conclusions and a public policy suggestion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In recent decades the theory of regulation has been concerned with determining the 
optimal rule for prices in sectors with natural monopoly characteristics2.  
The question becomes even more complex in network industries, to the extent that 
reforms advance in the direction of regulation by incentives, deregulation and other 
measures to stimulate competition. Vogelsang (2002) offers an interesting analysis of 
the performance of regulation with incentives in the past 20 years. According to the 
author, in the case of network industries, the opening of access to the incumbent’s 
network and its correct pricing can play a fundamental role in the efficiency of the 
regulatory apparatus and the maximization of social welfare3. 
                                                 
2  Viscusi et al. (1996) offer an ample and detailed discussion of the theme. 
3 The literature on access prices is more recent, among which we can mention Laffont and 
Tirole (1993, 1994), Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) and Vogelsang (2003). Haucap 
and Dewenter (2006) offer a more complete and integrated view of the literature. Specifically 
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In parallel to the discussion of access prices and competition, another debate has 
arisen regarding access prices and investment, particularly in fixed local telephone 
services, a sector that in many countries is facing a new wave of cost-based 
regulation. The basic question lies in the correct incentives for investments offered to 
regulated firms, that is, "are regulators, even if based on a forward-looking approach, 
supplying the correct incentives for investment and dynamic efficiency?"  
Works such as Sidak and Spulber (1997), Valletti and Estache (1998), Gans and 
Williams (1999), Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000), Gans (2001), Mandy and Sharkey 
(2003), Kotakorpi (2004) and Hori and Mizuno (2006) address the various aspects of 
the theme. Based on a variety of arguments, they reach a positive conclusion about 
the need to establish a markup on the forward-looking costs to stimulate investment4.  
The hypothesis adopted in this work converges to the same conclusion except by 
following another line of research. We rely on the real options methodology to 
establish the markup on the incumbent’s long-term forward-looking costs. This 
markup serves to remunerate the access provided to a new entrant, allowing correct 
decisions to invest in network infrastructure in a scenario of large and irreversible 
sunk costs and high uncertainty about future demand.  
The theory of options originated with the seminal works of Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1973), and was subsequently applied to real investments in pioneering 
studies such as Tourinho (1979), Myers (1984), Mason and Merton (1985), Brennan 
and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Majd and Pindyck (1987), Kester 
(1988) and Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988), among others5. Basically, the value 
(premium) of an option is the worth of the right to buy or sell a share (a call or put 
option, respectively), by a pre-established price (the strike price) until a certain date 
(the expiration time). Real options methodology consists of using the established tool 
of financial options to quantify the value of investments that encompass a series of 
flexibilities (options). This technique helps to reach decisions in certain projects in 
which the traditional cash flow method is not efficient.  
                                                                                                                                                        
regarding the telecommunications sector, the discussion of access pricing is well 
summarized in Laffont and Tirole (2000) and Armstrong (2002). 
4 The most detailed discussion of this subject can be found in Bragança (2005). 
5 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) are the classic references on the theme. 
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The question of real options has been directly related to regulation of tariffs and 
return on capital in regulated sectors since the works of Salinger (1998), Small and 
Ergas (1999), Alleman and Noam (1999) and Hausman (1999). These authors 
pointed out that investments will be discouraged when failing to consider the value of 
the options in determining tariffs or prices based on costs. More recent studies, such 
as Holms (2000), Hausman and Myers (2002), Clark and Easaw (2003), Dobbs 
(2004), Pindyck (2004, 2005) and Evans and Guthrie (2006), have sought to refine 
the models by adding different elements to the stochastic processes that underpin 
them. This study is based on those of Pindyck (2004, 2005), which introduced the 
pragmatic concept of the markup on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 
operators to cope with the option rationality. We additionally simulate the possibility of 
new technological paradigms, which cause negative jumps in market demand. 
 
3. Technological Aspects of the Sector 
The forms of interconnection we know today, regulated or not, are based on traffic 
between networks, associated with the provision of some type of service. The 
adoption of new technologies defines the infrastructures used as well as the range of 
services enabled. New technologies also can result in new business models and 
change the rules on competition and investment, even in the apparently consolidated 
fixed-line telephone business. 
Therefore, an understanding of the possible technological developments is essential 
to model the option premium, especially the component related to technological 
shocks.  
 
3.1. Technology Trends 
The evolution forecast in the area of telecommunication technology can be classified 
into three trends: i) growth of data traffic, ii) development of network architectures; 
and iii) offer of new services resulting from new technologies. These involve new 
forms of interconnection as well as changes in the rules on which the regulated forms 
of interconnection are currently based.  
 
3.1.1 Growth of Data Traffic 
Data traffic has been growing briskly, while purely voice traffic has been declining. 
The accelerated growth of data traffic is being driven by the spread of Internet access 
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and of private corporate data networks. Another tendency is the substitution of voice 
by data traffic, with the adoption of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Expectations 
are that new services will become available for both voice and data traffic, promoting 
their convergence.  
The evolution of data traffic depends on a series of factors, such as the technology 
available, the penetration of access networks and the development of new services 
based on data traffic. Among these, the development of IP telephony, next 
generation networks (NGNs) and wireless broadband access will be the leading 
determinants of the expansion of data traffic. 
 
3.1.2 Evolution of Network Architectures 
The forms of interconnection and the respective regulatory frameworks are based on 
interfaces between network architectures according to the type of traffic (fixed-
mobile, for example). Nevertheless, both the traffic and architecture characteristics 
are expected to change substantially in the foreseeable future, making current 
regulatory models ineffective.  
Many of the technologies that will play important roles in this evolution of networks 
already exist, although they do not yet represent a significant portion of 
telecommunications traffic. The most relevant developments in network architectures 
identified regarding interconnection are NGNs, Wi-Fi, 3G and Wimax. There is a 
reasonable consensus that these new technologies will play leading roles in the local 
fixed telephone market. A closer examination of these technologies can supply 
important indicators of the magnitude of the parameters incorporated in the model.  
 
3.1.3 New Services 
The evolution of networks and the increase in data traffic permit offering a greater 
variety of telecommunications services. The trend is one of convergence of data and 
voice traffic in the direction of multimedia services. 
 
3.2  Technological Shocks 
The technologies considered most relevant in determining where fixed telephony is 
headed are NGNs, VoIP, Wi-Fi / Wimax networks and 3G networks. As an example, 
below we look briefly at the prognosis for Wi-Fi / Wimax networks, which are one of 
the main threats to the local fixed telephone business model in the medium term. 
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3.2.1. Wi-Fi / Wimax 
The Wi-Fi technology is based on wireless networks for high-speed data 
transmission6. Wi-Fi permits wireless access to a data network from a fixed 
connection point. Because it provides high-speed data access, Wi-Fi can enable a 
greater supply of data services, aimed at a specific market segment, characterized 
by the need for mobility. 
A more powerful version of Wi-Fi, Wimax has been gaining importance. There are 
two types of Wimax: fixed and mobile. Fixed Wimax7 provides users with Internet 
access from a notebook anyplace, for example, within a radius of 50 kilometers of an 
antenna or radio base station (RBS). In contrast, mobile Wimax8 permits Internet 
access even while moving, at speed up to 100 Km/h, by switching signals between 
antennas.  
The medium-term impacts of Wimax technology on the revenue flows of fixed local 
telephone companies may well be significant. According to a study by Frost & 
Sullivan (2006) evaluating the impacts of implementing Wimax in Brazil, the adoption 
of this technology can reduce traditional local traffic measured in pulses (minutes 
starting in 2007)9 by at least 10% to 15% a year10. 
                                                 
6 Obeying the 802.11 standard from the Institute of Electric and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE). 
7 IEEE 802.16d standard. 
8 IEEE 802.16e standard. 
9 One “pulse” is charged as soon as the call is answered, and another one, dubbed random, 
is charged sometime in the next four minutes of the call. The others are charged at the rate 
of four every four minutes after the random pulse. In this way, a user who talks for one 
minute will be charged for at least one pulse, and will have a 25% chance of being charged 
for another (1 min/4min = 0.25). In reduced-rate periods (normally from midnight to 6:00 
a.m.), only one pulse is charged, regardless of the calling time. The new billing method 
measured in minutes is purely based on time. The tariff unit will be a tenth of a minute (six 
seconds), with a minimum billing time of 30 seconds. In reduced-rate periods, as before, the 
charge will be per call answered, regardless of duration. 
10 The integral adoption of Wimax (3.5 and 10.5 Ghz) technologies started to be defined by 
Anatel for an auction originally scheduled to take place in the second half of 2006. But 
lawsuits and errors in the bid invitation, indicated by the Federal Accounts Tribunal, forced its 
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 4. Real Option Model  
By investing in a fixed line telephone network, a landline operator deals with several 
features, such as the magnitude of sunk costs, uncertainty of demand, unpredictable 
technological shocks, flexibility of delay and competitive erosion. Such characteristics 
have intrinsic links to the option pricing literature, where the rational investor 
demands a premium above the sunk cost to commit in any investment. Roughly 
speaking, the more the uncertainty, the higher the premium requested.  
Regarding the Brazilian fixed telephone system, according to the current regulation 
the incumbent must provide unfettered access to its infrastructure to new entrants. 
Therefore, by incurred in the investment, the landline operator is actually providing an 
option to access its network.  
Having in mind the economic reasoning that options are not costless and 
interconnection price are defined by the regulator and not by incumbents, the 
regulator should attempt to consider the option as an effective cost incurred by the 
fixed operators when establishing the proper tariffs, i.e., the access price.  
However, despite the theoretical debate on estimating the interconnection price, the 
new regulatory orientation points to a tariff policy based on long-run incremental 
costs (LRIC). LRIC consist mainly (particularly in the local fixed segment) of the sunk 
costs and the corresponding return on capital employed or invested.  
We argue that the economic reasoning of option pricing is not being addressed, and 
an effort to estimate the option premium is required in order to adequately 
remunerate the operator, providing economic incentives to supply both the magnitude 
and trajectory of local network infrastructure investments that would occur in a 
competitive environment. In short, the regulator should enforce dynamic efficiency 
without harming the objectives of encouraging competition. 
                                                                                                                                                        
cancellation. The new auction is now scheduled for the second half of 2007. The entry price 
for this technology is still very high by Brazilian standards (around US$ 500.00 per access 
line), which can slow this rate of decline of traditional local traffic measured in pulses. 
Additionally, the inclusion of incumbent fixed providers in the auction for Wimax frequency 
spectrum by court order (albeit still subject to appeals) might simply mean the substitution of 
local pulses by switching and transport of packets via the incumbents’ local and Wi-Fi 
networks, meaning maintenance or even gain of revenues. 
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A markup on the cost of capital (i.e. the weighted average cost of capital – WACC) of 
the Brazilian telephone sector is a pragmatic approach to cope with the economic 
rationality of option pricing.  
Let PP* be the interconnection price corrected by the access option f granted by the 
incumbent in undertaking the investment, and P be the usual LRIC without 
considering any options adjustments. The appropriated tariff P*P  that compensates the 
operator can be represented by the following equation, which considers the access 
option f as an additional sunk cost incurred by the operator: 
*P P f= +                                                        (2) 
 
We adopt a similar criterion as Pindyck (2004, 2005), where the usual 
interconnection price P refers to the investment cost k reimbursed for its capital cost 
through a WACC (ρ) based annuity payment, over lifetime T of the facility. 
.(1 )
(1 ) 1
T
TP k
ρ ρ
ρ
⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠                                                    (3) 
Since the WACC is closely related to the risks and characteristics of the sector under 
analysis, namely fixed local telephony, we assume that the WACC estimated by the 
regulator in the tariff revision process is valid for establishing the interconnection tariff 
based on the LRIC.  
By using Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), the corrected tariff PP* can be written as a function of the 
adjusted cost of capital WACC (ρ*). This corrected WACC (ρ*) is a pragmatic way to 
cope with the rationality of real options, and can be viewed as a markup over the cost 
of capital of the sector.  
( )
( )
( )
( ) (
* *
*
*
1 1
1 11 1
T T
T T )P kρ ρ ρ ρρρ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⋅ + ⋅ +⎜ ⎟= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + −+ − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
k f+                               (4) 
Therefore, the problem resumes in determining f, the option premium for access. 
Access is granted at the time the investment is incurred. Therefore the option must 
be estimated at the moment of its optimal exercise. The option premium calculation is 
shown in the next section. 
 
4.1 The Investment Opportunity 
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Consider an operator with significant market power, which holds an investment 
opportunity f (option) to invest in a fixed-line phone network. The sunk cost k of the 
investment equals the strike price of the option. Each line produces annual cash 
flows during a lifetime of T years. The present value V of these cash streams 
corresponds to the current value of the project, the underlying asset of the option. 
We assume that V follows the Merton jump-diffusion type model11, where α is the 
expected return of the project over an infinitesimal time dt, λ is the frequency of the 
jump process, φ is the percentage magnitude of the jump, dz is the Wiener process12 
and dq is the Poisson increment, with dq.dz = 0. 
 
( )dV dt dz dq
V
α λφ σ= − + +
                                           (5) 
Eq.(5) states that most of the time the value of the project evolves continuously 
according to a Brownian diffusion process (second term of Eq.(5)), while allowing for 
the probability of unpredictable and discrete variations, i.e. jumps (last term of 
Eq.(5)). When a jump occurs, the project increases (φ > 0) or decreases (φ < 0) its 
value by φ percent.  
The reasoning of the jump-diffusion model is to capture some well-known stylized 
facts of the telecommunications sector, especially of the fixed-line phone system, 
such as technological shocks with negative impact on the value of the project that 
could even alter the economic feasibility of the whole investment.  
We assume that the jump term is idiosyncratic, representing only unsystematic risks, 
that is, sector-specific risks, which can be eliminated through a diversification 
strategy. Options theory permits rewriting Eq.(5) in the risk-neutral measure of Eq.(6), 
replacing the expected rate of return α by the difference between the risk-free rate r 
and the opportunity cost δ of the option (equivalent to a convenience or dividend 
yield): 
( )dV r dt dz
V
δ λφ σ dq= − − + +
                                          (6) 
                                                 
11 Merton (1976). 
12 A Wiener process, also known as Brownian motion, has three classic properties. It is a 
Markovian process, with independent increments, where changes in the process in a finite 
interval follow a normal distribution with variance that increases linearly with time. 
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The opportunity cost of an option consists by the cost of holding the option instead of 
the project itself. This cost represents losses by competitive erosion, costs for 
keeping the option “alive”, or even the cash flows generated by the project not 
received by the option holder. By using the same argument presented by Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), the opportunity cost can be written as the difference between the 
project’s cost of capital ρ and the project’s expected growth rate α, so that δ = ρ − α > 
0.  
The investment opportunity f(V) corresponds to a perpetual call option that can be 
exercised at any moment by paying the strike price k. The dynamic of the option is 
given by the following partial differential equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 21 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0
2 VV V
V f V r Vf V r f V f Vσ δ λφ λ λ φ⎡ ⎤+ − − − + + + =⎣ ⎦          (7) 
subject to the standard boundary conditions: 
(0) 0f =                                                             (8)      
* *( )f V V k= −                                                    (9)     
*( ) 1Vf V =                                                          (10) 
Eq.(8) is usual in the continuous Brownian process, Eq.(9) represents the value-
matching condition where the option is exercised by paying the strike price, and 
Eq.(10) is the smooth-pasting condition. 
By inspection, the solution of Eq.(7) is given by: 
( )f V AV β=                                                    (11) 
where β is the positive root of the following nonlinear equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1
2
r r βσ β β δ λφ β λ λ φ− + − − − + + + = 0
                     (12) 
The optimal exercise moment V* is given by: 
*
1
V kββ= −                                                    (13) 
and the constant A is determined as follows: 
( )
*
*
V kA
V
β
−=
                                                   (14) 
 
4.2 Parameter Estimates 
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In this section we estimate the parameters for the proposed model using data from 
the Brazilian fixed-line phone operators.  
Table 1 presents the economic feasibility analysis of an average line in service (ALS) 
with a lifetime of 10 years, showing a typical free cash flow forecast. The main 
accounting rubrics are revenue net of taxes and other charges of the fixed network 
(net rev); the operating cost of the ALS (opex), usually expressed as a percentage of 
net revenue; the investment sunk cost, or capital expenditure (capex); and the 
accounting depreciation (depr), since the latter includes the corporate tax benefit rate 
(τ).  
The components of net revenue include: i) subscription fee; ii) local fixed-fixed calls 
(the number of local pulses billed divided by the average number of lines in service 
times the average rate per pulse); and iii) local fixed-mobile calls (the number of VC-1 
minutes elapsed from the fixed-line entering the mobile system divided by the 
average number of terminals in service times the average VC-1 rate per minute). 
The subscription fee was obtained from the weighted average of the subscriptions in 
the residential, non-residential and trunk classes. Through data from Anatel’s Tariff 
Adjustment System (Anatel (2006)), we ascertained that 55% of lines belong to the 
residential class, 35% are non-residential and 10% are trunk lines. Therefore, 
weighting the average tariff rate approved by Anatel in 2005 by the percentage for 
each class in each concession area, we reach an average tariff net of taxes and 
other charges of around BRL$ 35.00 per month.  
For local fixed-fixed revenue, the average number of pulses billed in Brazil in 2005 
was 114 minutes a month per average line in service (ALS), according to the SRT 
data from Anatel (2006). The average rate approved by the agency for a local pulse, 
weighted by the number of lines in each concession area, was estimated for 2005 at 
BRL$ 0.11/pulse (Anatel, 2004, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d and 2006).  
Finally, regarding local fixed-mobile traffic (VC-1), we started with aggregated 
national data on the number of fixed-mobile minutes in the same geographic region 
billed by the local landline incumbents, which represents the average number of 
minutes of local calls between fixed and mobile phones. According to SRT data from 
Anatel (2006), the VC-1 traffic observed in 2005 was 419 minutes. The VC-1 tariff 
was the overall average of all those approved by Anatel, which led to a value of BRL$ 
0.47/minute, also according to SRT data.  
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Regarding the projection of the net revenue streams over the lifetime of an ALS, we 
assumed a rate of decay of 2% p.a., a figure obtained from the hypothesis adopted 
by Anatel (2007) and based on the concessionaires’ financial statements.  
For opex, the direct proportion of the net revenue is taken from the sum of the list of 
accounts specified in Anatel Resolution 396, issued in 200513. We used a figure for 
opex similar to that employed by Anatel, which corresponds to 53% of the net 
revenue of the ALS. 
The capex, which corresponds to the strike price of the option (k), was also taken 
from Anatel Resolution 39614. We obtained a value of BRL$ 1374 per ALS as the 
required investment on average to establish a local fixed-line network. 
Considering a corporate tax rate (τ) for Brazil at 34% (KMPG (2006)), a 10-year 
linear depreciation for capex and a cost of capital WACC (ρ) for the 
telecommunication sector estimated as 14% p.a. in real terms (Bragança, Rocha and 
Camacho (2006)), the present value (V) of the cash flows of the project is estimated 
at BRL$ 1381, for a internal rate of return (IRR) of 14.13% p.a. 
Table 1 – Cash Flow Projection  
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
+ Net Revenue  752 737 722 708 694 680 667 653 640 628 
Subscription fee  412 403 395 387 380 372 365 357 350 343 
BRL$ 35 / month            
Local F-F  147 145 142 139 136 133 131 128 126 123 
Traffic (114 monthly pulses /ALS)            
                                                 
13 This resolution specifies the breakdown of the accounting system that must be used by 
fixed concessionaires, by separation and allocation of accounting rubrics. The first data 
adjusted to this resolution are in the database of Anatel’s Office of Public Services for 2005. 
The main innovational of this resolution is to disaggregate the expenses and revenues of 
landline concessionaires according to service rendered, giving more precision than 
previously provided in the traditional balance sheets and other financials published by the 
operators according to the rules of the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM). Thus, there is 
greater accuracy, for example, in obtaining the costs tied to local service of an average line 
in service. 
14 The disaggregated network elements were calculated through the accounting statements 
and specific investments in the essential elements to offer local services. We decided to use 
an overall average because of the idiosyncrasies of each fixed concessionaire in relation to 
the region of the country. 
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Average tariff of BRL$ 0.11/pulse            
Local F-M  193 189 185 182 178 175 171 168 164 161 
VC-1/ALS traffic (419 min/year)            
Average tariff of  BRL$ 0.47/min            
- Opex (53% of Net Revenue)  -399 -391 -383 -375 -368 -360 -353 -346 -339 -333 
= EBITDA  353 346 340 333 326 320 313 307 301 295 
-Depreciation  -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 -137 
-Income Taxes/Contributions @ 34%  -73 -71 -69 -66 -64 -62 -60 -58 -56 -54 
+Depreciation  137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 
= FCF  280 275 271 266 262 258 253 249 245 241 
Present Value V @ 14% p.a. 1381           
IRR 14.13%           
Capex (k) 1374           
            
Source: Annual balance sheets of the Brazilian fixed-line operators (2000 to 2005). 
The analysis of Table 1 permits establishing the current values of the option, which 
are the underlying asset (V0), BRL$ 1381/ALS, and the strike price (k), R$ 1374/ALS. 
To estimate the volatility parameter (σ) described by Eq.(5) for the project’s return, 
we followed Brandão and Dyer (2005a, b). We estimated the volatility parameter to 
be 2.7% p.a.15 as shown in the Appendix. 
We assumed a 10% p.a. for the risk-free rate (r) in real terms16, -2% p.a. for the 
growth rate (α)17 and 16% p.a. for the opportunity cost of capital (δ)18.  
For the technological shocks we based our assumption on the analysis conducted by 
Anatel (2007b), by which a technological shock (φ) with an effect of –20% on the 
project’s value will occur once every five years, meaning a jump-frequency (λ) of 20% 
p.a. 
                                                 
15 The low volatility is due to the subscription fee, considered a deterministic variable, and 
equal to 55% of the total net revenue. 
16 The risk-free rate in real terms was estimated by using the rates on 10-year DI x IPCA 
swaps on the Mercantile and Futures Exchange (BM&F) as of October 2006. DI is the 
Brazilian interbank deposit rate and IPCA is the Brazilian consumer price index. 
17 This figure was employed by Anatel (2006) in estimating the revenue per average line in 
service. 
18 The opportunity cost of capital, as explained, is given by the difference between the 
expected rate of return and the capital gains, δ = ρ - α. For more details see Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). 
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Given all the parameters called for in Eq.(5), the option premium and the markup on 
the cost of capital can be estimated using Eqs. (7-10) and Eq.(4). 
 
4.3 Results 
Figure 1 presents the option value for the investment in an ALS. The option 
converges smoothly to the NPV rules as the project’s expected value increases. 
Option is triggered immediately at the threshold V*, i.e. the optimal timing for 
exercising the option. Thus, the classic investment rule is not satisfied, since a 
rational investor will demand an additional premium over the sunk cost of R$ 1374 (k) 
in order to commit to the investment. This premium grows as the uncertainties 
involved in the project increase. 
 
Figure 1 – Option Value and Optimal Exercise 
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Having established the option premium f at the optimal timing19, we used Eq. (4) to 
estimate the adjusted cost of capital (ρ*) that copes with the real option reasoning. 
We estimated an adjusted WACC at 14.4% p.a., which represents a markup of 0.4% 
in the cost of capital of the sector.  
                                                 
19 At the time of exercise, the option equals the NPV, that is, V* - k. 
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We should point out that this additional 0.4% applies on an estimated remuneration 
base of more than BRL$ 25 billion20 according to the preliminary calculations of 
Anatel for 2004 (the most recent figure available at this writing).  
Also, our estimates show that the 0.4% markup on WACC is quite sensitive to both 
volatility of project’s return and technological shocks. Figures 2, 3 and 4 depict the 
sensitivity analysis in relation to these critical parameters. 
                                                 
20 US$ 14 billion converted by the exchange rate of October 2007, BRL$ 1.78 / USD. 
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Figure 2 – Markup on WACC x Volatility 
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Figure 3 – Markup on WACC x Jump Arrivals 
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Figure 4 - Markup on WACC x Jump Size 
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As it can be seen in these graphs, under reasonable scenarios of volatility and 
technological shocks, the markup on the traditional cost of capital can reach 
significant levels of over 1% with the reasoning of real options pricing.  
 
5. Conclusions and Future Recommendations 
Policies to stimulate competition in the fixed telephone sector rest on the basic pillars 
of interconnection and disaggregation of networks. The new cost orientation policy 
implemented in Brazil in 2005 with the goal of establishing interconnection tariffs and 
pricing of unbundled network elements makes the return on capital a key factor. 
By investing in a fixed-line telephone network while giving access to new entrants, 
the incumbent is actually providing an option to access its infrastructure, which 
should be considered as an effective cost by the regulator in determining the 
interconnection tariff of the network. 
The literature on access price and real options shows that simply establishing prices 
equal to the long-run incremental cost (LRIC) in a climate of uncertainties and sunk 
costs creates an imbalance in the incumbent’s risk / return ratio that can cause 
serious damage to the trajectory of investments in network infrastructure and 
innovation.  
Based on some stylized factors of the sector, such as technological shocks, this 
study proposed a pragmatic effort to incorporate the real options rationale as a 
markup on the cost of capital (WACC) of the sector. 
We based our estimation on public financial and operating data from the financial 
statements of the telephone companies, several resolutions issued by the regulator 
(Anatel) and inferences regarding the demand for fixed-fixed and fixed-mobile local 
calls. 
The result points to a markup of roughly 0.4%, recalling that this will be applied on a 
remuneration base greater than BRL$ 25 billion (roughly US$ 14 billion in October 
2007).  
In light of these findings, we believe it is important for Brazilian policymakers to 
consider real options in implementing the LRIC, and consequently, the cost-oriented 
competition policies in the sector. Failing to consider this rationality means the 
incumbent will be remunerated below its opportunity cost, which will inevitably 
discourage investments in infrastructure in the sector and consequently reduce both 
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the dynamic efficiency of the policy adopted to stimulate competition and the social 
welfare generated by these services. 
 
Appendix: Estimating the Project Volatility  
 
To estimate the volatility parameter (σ) of the expected project’s return described in 
Eq. (5), we followed Brandão and Dyer (2005a, b), who modified the Copeland and 
Antikarov (2003) approach21, and propose estimations based on conditional 
expectations. Stochastic inputs of the project are simulated just one period ahead 
and the expected present value of the project (VP1) is estimated conditional to the 
simulation up to this period. 
The volatility of the project’s return (σ) is given by the standard deviation of the 
distribution z, defined by Eq.(A1), where VP0 equals the expected present value of 
the project in period zero: 
1
0
VPz ln
VP
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝
%%
⎠
                                                
                                                                (A1) 
The stochastic inputs used to estimate the project’s value in a telephone line (ALS) 
rely on the demand side for the service: i) pulses billed (x) per average line in service 
(ALS); and ii) VC-1 traffic (y) per ALS. The subscription fee, which represents a large 
proportion (55%) of the ALS revenue, was considered deterministic.  
Figure A1 depicts the demand for local fixed telephone service with the monthly 
evolution of the pulses recorded and billed in the period from January 2000 through 
July 2006, according to SRT data from Anatel (2006) (the difference between the two 
series corresponds to the subscription free). 
 
21 We also recommend the debate available at Smith (2005).  
 20
 Figure A1: Pulses per Average Line in Service 
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Source: Annual financial statements of fixed operators from 2000 to 2006. 
 
We assumed that both pulses billed (x) per ALS and the VC-1 traffic (y) per ALS 
follow the stochastic differential equations below, with dz1 and dz2 not correlated. 
1x x
dx dt dz
x
α σ= +
                                                (A2) 
2y y
dy dt dz
y
α σ= +
                                               (A3) 
We estimated the volatility σx at 2.87% per month, or 10% p.a.22 and due to the lack 
of data for VC-1 traffic, we adopted the conservative hypothesis of σy=σx, i.e., the 
volatility of fixed-mobile (VC-1) traffic is the same as for fixed-fixed traffic. Regarding 
the growth rates αx and αy , we employed the same figure of Anatel (2006) of –2% 
p.a.  
After estimating the stochastic inputs, we run simulations for the project’s value. 
Following Eq.(A1) we estimate the volatility (σ) for the project’s return at 2.7% p.a. 
 
   
                                                 
22 Considering that the variance grows with time. 
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